On The (In-)Security Of JavaScript Object Signing And Encryption

Dennis Detering, Juraj Somorovsky, Christian Mainka, Vladislav Mladenov, Jörg Schwenk

ROOTS, November 16–17, 2017, Vienna, Austria


Abstract

JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) has evolved to the de-facto standard file format in the web used for application configuration, cross- and same-origin data exchange, as well as in Single Sign-On (SSO) protocols such as OpenID Connect. To protect integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of sensitive data, JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE) was created to apply cryptographic mechanisms directly in JSON messages. We investigate the security of JOSE and present different applicable attacks on several popular libraries. We introduce JOSEPH (JavaScript Object Signing and Encryption Pentesting Helper) – our newly developed Burp Suite extension, which automatically performs security analysis on targeted applications. JOSEPH’s automatic vulnerability detection ranges from executing simple signature exclusion or signature faking techniques, which neglect JSON message integrity, up to highly complex cryptographic Bleichenbacher attacks, breaking the confidentiality of encrypted JSON messages. We found severe vulnerabilities in six popular JOSE libraries. We responsibly disclosed all weaknesses to the developers and helped them to provide fixes.

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tags: Bleichenbacher Attack, Burp Suite, JOSE, JSON Web Encryption, JSON Web Signature, Key Confusion