

Sec² SECURE MOBILE SOLUTION FOR DISTRIBUTED PUBLIC CLOUD STORAGES hg Chair for Network and Data Security

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Motivation Risks of Cloud Storage

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Sources:

[isc.sans.edu, www.cloudtweaks.com, nakedsecurity.sophos.com, www.infoworld.com, www.hgi.rub.de, www.zdnet.com, www.futuregov.asia, www.pcworld.com]

Cloud Storage Security Status Quo





- Status Quo
 - No encryption

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- No encryption
- Provider based encryption

Cloud Storage Security Status Quo



- No encryption
- Provider based encryption
- User based encryption with desktop tools (Truecrypt, GPG, ...)

Status which would be desirable



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• Secure storage of user supplied data on any cloud storage

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- Group communication and collaboration capabilities

Cloud Storage Security Status which would be desirable

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 - Group communication and collaboration capabilities
 - Complete control over data by group participants / particular users



- Secure storage of user supplied data on any cloud storage
- Group communication and collaboration capabilities
- Complete control over data by group participants / particular users
- No trust relationships between user and cloud storage provider





- User controlled security
 - Users keep control over their data



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- Scalability
 - Extensible, modular and interoperable architecture



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- Transparency
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- Seamless integration
 - Easy to integrate in existing systems
- Hybrid Documents
 - Partly encrypted documents with unencrypted public blocks





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- (optional) Integrity
 - achieved by (optional) using XML Signature on payload data
- Tagging of encrypted data

- achieved by providing unencrypted public document parts for non-confidential data

Sec² Concept Example Scenario

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Module Scheme





Module Scheme 1/2

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- Applications
 - End user application



Module Scheme 1/2

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- Applications
 - End user application
- Sec² Middleware
 - Core processing



SEC²: Secure Mobile Solution For Distributed Public Cloud Storages CLOSER 2012 | Porto, Portugal | April 18 – 21, 2012

Sec² Architecture

Module Scheme 1/2

- Applications
 - End user application
- Sec² Middleware
 - Core processing
- XML Encryption Engine
 - En-/Decryption





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 - Core processing
- XML Encryption Engine
 - En-/Decryption
- Key Manager
 - Key management
 - Key generation
 - Key fetching





Module Scheme 1/2

- Applications
 - End user application
- Sec² Middleware
 - Core processing
- XML Encryption Engine
 - XML en-/decryption
- Key Manager
 - Key management
 - Key generation
 - Key fetching
- MicroSD Card
 - Secure key storage
 - Key wrapping





Module Scheme 2/2



- VHO Layer
 - Seamless roaming beyond transport media boundaries



Module Scheme 2/2



- VHO Layer
 - Seamless roaming beyond transport media boundaries
- Trustworthy Key Server
 - Hardware secured key deposit





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Sec² Architecture

Module Scheme 2/2

- VHO Layer
 - Seamless roaming beyond transport media boundaries
- Trustworthy Key Server
 - Hardware secured key deposit
- Untrusted Cloud Storage Service
 - Storage for data





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 - Authentication
 - Key wrap
 - User specific





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 - Key wrap
 - User specific
- (sym) Cluster key
 - Document key wrap
 - Group specific
- (sym) Document key
 - Payload en-/decryption



Sec² Architecture Communication Example





Time for discussion...

... time for your questions



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int getRandomNumber() return 4; // chosen by fair dice roll. // guaranteed to be random. 3

Source: [www.xkcd.com]



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