NDS Wissenschaftler gewinnen europäischen Forschungspreis

15.11.2019 - Martin Grothe

Mit Ihrem ACM CCS 2019 Paper 1 Trillion Dollar Refund – How To Spoof PDF Signatures konnten die NDS & Hackmanit Forscher um Dr.-Ing. Vladislav Mladenov, Dr.-Ing. Christian Mainka, Karsten Meyer zu Selhausen, Martin Grothe und Prof. Dr. Jörg Schwenk die Jury des CSAW Applied Research Contests überzeugen und gewannen am Freitag den 08.11.2019 den 1. Platz. Sie setzten sich dabei mit Ihrer Publikation gegen eine hochkarätige, europaweite Mitbewerberschaft durch, welche Ihre Arbeiten ebenfalls bei Top Tier Konferenzen veröffentlichten.

Workshop on Attacks in Cryptography

07.10.2019 - Juraj Somorovsky

In August 2019, we organized the second edition of the Workshop on Attacks in Cryptography (WAC2). This workshop was part of the famous CRYPTO conference in Santa Barbara and its aim was to bring together researchers working on cryptographic attacks. They provided a showcase of their work for the Crypto community. Among others, invited list of speakers contained Matthew Green, Mathy Vanhoef, and Nadia Heninger.

The workshop website with the slides is available here: https://crypto.iacr.org/2019/affevents/wac/page.html

Thanks to our sponsors (CASA and Hackmanit), we were also able to record videos: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLeeS-3Ml-rpo5tZgu7J2MhnrCJf0lSsqn

PDF Insecurity at ACM CCS 2019

30.09.2019 - Christian Mainka

We have published two papers on the 26th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security in London.

Our first paper is 1 Trillion Dollar Refund -- How To Spoof PDF Signatures and deals with the insecurity of PDF Signatures.

Our second paper is Practical Decryption exFiltration: Breaking PDF Encryption and shows how to extract plaintext out of encrypted PDFs.

More information can be found on PDF-insecurity.org and in our Blogposts "How to Spoof PDF Signature" and "PDFex - Major Security Flaws in PDF Encryption".

Security flaws in email signatures and end-to-end encryption

16.08.2019 - Jens Müller

In cooperation Münster University of Applied Sciences, we published two more “Johnny” papers on email security. “Johnny, you are fired!” (USENIX Security 2019, https://usenix.org/system/files/sec19-muller.pdf) shows practicals forgery attacks against various implementations of OpenPGP and S/MIME email signature verification in five different attack classes. “Re: What's up Johnny” (ACNS 2019, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1904.07550) depicts covert content attacks on OpenPGP and S/MIME encryption and signatures in the context of email. In both papers we do not target the underlying cryptographic primitives, but instead abuse legitimate features of email-related RFCs.

Improvements to the SAML-Attacker tool

03.07.2019 - Marcus Brinkmann

We added two new features to our SAML-Attacker of our Burp Suite extension EsPReSSO <https://github.com/RUB-NDS/BurpSSOExtension> to probe for XML encryption weaknesses and signature wrapping vulnerabilities.

Complete article